The paper studies, in a repeated interaction setting, how the presence of cooperative agents in a heterogeneous community organized in groups, a¤ects group e¢ ciency and stability. The paper extends the literature by assuming that each type can pro…tably mimic other types. It is shown that such enlargement of pro…table options prevents group stabilization in the single group case. Stabilization can be obtained with many groups, but its driver is not the e¢ ciency gain due to the presence of cooperative individuals. Instead stabilization is the result of free riding opportunities.
Introduction
This paper studies how the degree of cooperativeness a¤ects e¢ ciency in a community organized in groups, when individual type is private information and group stability is endogenous. In this regards our interest is akin to Ghosh and Ray's (1996) . They consider a population composed by patient and impatient individuals. Initially, individuals are randomly matched in pairs to play a prisoner dilemma in continuous strategies. At the end of each period partners may opt between continuing their current relationship or separating and trying another random matching. In case of break o¤, information about partners'type is not disclosed to the rest of the population. It is shown that the presence of the impatient type gives a value to the fact of being matched with the good type, which can support cooperation among patient players. Equilibrium strategies contemplate an initial round in which players test their fellows by setting a moderate level of cooperation. If the partner is patient, he does the same and an ever-lasting relationship starts, where cooperation is at its highest possible level. If the partner is impatient, he does Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche,Università di Padova, Via del Santo 33 . tel: +39 49 8274224; e-mail: ottorino.chillemi@unipd.it y Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche,Università di Padova, Via del Santo 33 . tel: +39 49 8274225; e-mail: benedetto.gui@unipd.it z Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche,Università di Padova, Via del Santo 33 . tel: +39 49 8274260; e-mail: lorenzo.rocco@unipd.it not cooperate and the relationship breaks down. Therefore, equilibrium permanent relationships emerge with a positive e¤ect on social surplus. Similar result can be found in Kranton (1996) - for later contributions see Rauch and Watson (2002) and Watson (2002) -and in the reputation building literature following the seminal paper of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) .
At …rst sight, Ghosh and Ray's results are somewhat surprising, since one might expect that the incentive costs of exploiting information, elicited in the early phase of a relationship, exceed the bene…t from exploitation itself, according to the logic of the "ratchet" e¤ect. However, a careful examination shows that such exploitation costs never arise in their framework. On the one hand, "bad" (impatient) agents do not face any temptation to mimic patient players -they always …nd it advantageous to defect at the …rst occasion. On the other hand, "good" agents can only accede to the bene…ts of a stable relationship by being considered patient. So, absent any incentive to dissimulate one's true type, the ratchet e¤ect is excluded by de…nition.
Instead, in the model we present below the bad type may mimic the good type for the relationship to be stabilized and then, when stabilization will …nally obtain, exploit their partners -we keep the assumption that information disclosure is local.
Let us brie ‡y describe our setting. We consider a two-period model in which members of a large population of risk-neutral individuals interact in groups. Initially, groups are formed randomly. After completing the …rst round of interaction, each group can either continue interaction or dissolve. In case of dissolution, former group members are randomly assigned to newly formed "fresh" groups. In both periods group members bargain over sharing the cost of provision of an indivisible local public good. Bargaining is modelled as a direct revelation mechanism in which a benevolent principal maximizes expected group surplus over the rest of the game 1 . Individual type is bi-dimensional. The …rst dimension is the degree of alignment of the objective function of the agent with that of the principal (we refer to this feature as altruism towards fellow group members). This is a time-invariant characteristic, which is privately learned at the beginning of the whole game. The second dimension, which is privately learned at the beginning of each period, is agent's own "material" bene…t deriving from the consumption of the public good.
The probability distribution of types is the same across individuals and also over time, and is common knowledge. Moreover, the two components of an individual's type are stochastically independent. We also assume that no intertemporal and intergroup transfers are possible and that information revealed within a group does not leak outside.
Decisions concerning continuation/stabilization of a group are taken by the …rst-period principal. In case of continuation he transmits information about group composition to group members and to his second-stage successor, whose task reduces to operating a mechanism for the revelation of agents'second-period levels of material bene…t from the public good. We analyze the adverse incentive e¤ects that prevent group members from taking full advantage from the information about group composition that emerges in the …rst stage of the game. We show that stable relationships can emerge in equilibrium; this has positive value for group members, but hurts society, in the sense that social surplus is lower than in a situation in which stable relationships are forbidden.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 contains the main results, Section 4 discusses the robustness of our …ndings and suggests possible extensions, Sections 5 concludes. Minor technical proofs are collected in two appendices.
The model
At date t = 1 , nature randomly forms N groups, each one composed of n members. Next in each group a benevolent surplus maximizer principal announces the probabilities of provision of the public good and the payments due by each individual. Both probabilities and payments are functions of all members'reported types. The principal also announces the probability that the group is stabilized, that is, all members remain together, in which case he will inform the secondperiod principal and all members about individuals'permanent types, as a function of reported types. Observing the menu of proposed allocations and probabilities of group stabilization, each group member con…dentially reports his type to his principal. At date t = 2, non stabilized groups dissolve and their members are randomly matched into fresh groups, where they play again the direct revelation mechanism faced at date 1, under the rule of a new principal -of course, the decision about group's stabilization is inessential in the second period since as it ends the game stops. Instead, the members of stabilized groups play a direct mechanism for the revelation of their material bene…t under the supervision of a new principal and common knowledge of members'permanent types. For the sake of simplicity, in our analysis agents learn about their mates'types by observing realized payments. To this end, in the model goods are produced and consumed, and transfers are paid only and the end of the second period.
The sake of simplicity also motivates the assumption that the …rst-period and the secondperiod principals do not coincide. This allows us to avoid consideration of intertemporal strategies and also of the tricky issue of what information the principal should communicate to the agents 2 .
Agents'preferences are modelled as follows. Type-e agents maximize their own present and future material bene…ts; type-a agents are more aligned with the principal: they assign a positive weight also to the material bene…t (present and future) of the current fellows, provided that their own material bene…t is positive -an agent's utility being in…nitely negative otherwise.
Therefore type-a agents do not take into account the bene…t that will accrue to the new fellows they will interact with in case the group is dissolved 3 . However, if dissolution occurs, when taking their second period decisions, they will be concerned with the welfare of their fellows at that time. Furthermore, from the outset, they rationally anticipate the consequences of such concern on their own future material bene…ts. This kind of concern characterizes the attitude of an agent who, when interacting with a group of people, takes his fellows'welfare into account.
However, their welfare is not for him a source of utility to be included in his own intertemporal maximand (on this see Sen 1985) .
In order to set a reasonable limit to the possibility of redistribution, we posit that individual payments cannot be negative. Furthermore we posit that the budget must balance within each group in each period.
To further simplify, we will only consider the cases in which members of a …rst-period group meet again in fresh groups with probability one and with probability zero, respectively -so we disregard the case in which this probability is fractional. This corresponds to N = 1 (one group only), and to N = 1 (a very large number of groups), respectively:
Given that individuals are ex-ante identical, we can limit our attention to anonymous mechanisms; moreover, we focus on truth-telling, symmetric, perfect Bayes-Nash equilibria. Now, we can state a list of objects.
The individual type in period i is t i = (t 1; t i 2 )2T = fa; eg fh; lg where t 1 is the alignment parameter, assumed to be time invariant, and t i 2 is the private bene…t from the public good, a time-varying parameter.
The cost of the public good is c > 0.
At date 1, it is common knowledge that Pr(t 1 = a) = 2 (0; 1), Pr(t 1 = e) = 1 ;
2 ), all i. A realization of agents' type pro…le, i.e. a state, at date i is denoted v i . A state is 2 The timing of production and payment can be the usual one -that is, public goods are produced and transfers are paid at the end of each period -when the number of active groups is very large, since in such a case the realized state in a …rst period group does not convey any additional information on the population distribution.
3 Instead, in his …rst-period decisions a type-a agent assigns a positive weight to the future welfare of his …rst-period fellows even if in the second period they will be dispersed.
completely described by the number of agents of each type, v
Heretofore we will omit the zeros and -for the reader's comfort -we write, for example, v i = (nah) in place of v i = (n; 0; 0; 0); v i = (kah:(n k)eh) in place of v i = (k; 0; n k; 0); and so on.
When considering the possibility of agents deviating from truth-telling, we need to consider only one deviator at a time. So we express the reported state as a function of the true state and the deviation in the following way.
Let j 2 J = f1; 2; s k ; k = 0; 1; ::; ng denote, respectively, a period-one group, a period-two fresh group, a period-two stabilized group, with k type-a members. 
To emphasize that in second period stabilized groups the permanent type has already been revealed at time 1, we write
: Now, we start to de…ne a second list of more complex objects.
The payment, if any, due by an individual who reports d j in a group j when the reported
The probability of provision of the public good when the re-
al is the probability that a …rst-period principal opts for stabilization and informs the second-period principal about individual types: it is a function of the reported number of type-a members. We denote 
The unconditional probability of state v i is Pr v i while Pr j v i denotes the probability of state v i as seen by a j-group principal. To illustrate the latter, let n = 2: Then, for instance, Pr s1 (ah:eh) = p 2 ; Pr 1 (ah:eh) = 2 p (1 ) p; Pr 2 (ah:eh) = 2 p (1 ) p; where is obtained by applying Bayes'rule using the strategies of …rst-period principals. Moreover, Pr(k) denotes the probability a …rst-period principal assigns to the event that the number of type-a members in his group is k.
Under truth-telling, the principal of a j-group computes current expected surplus as
(Notice that i = 1 when j = 1 and i = 2 otherwise.)
>From the perspective of a member of type t 1 who reports d 1 , his …rst-period expected material surplus is
Similarly, the expected surplus in a j-group, j 6 = 1; of an agent of type t 2 who reported d
In the …rst period, a type t 1 individual who reports d 1 expects that the total …rst period surplus to his fellows is
Similarly, for j 6 = 1; in a j-group, a type t 2 individual who reports d j , after having reported d 1 1 in the …rst period expects that the total surplus accruing to his current fellows is
Let b k k; t 1 ; d 
where 1 Let z
Then, the objective function of an agent in group j 6 = 1 is
i.e. the sum of individual material surplus and of his fellows'surplus weighted by his alignment parameter. This formulation sets a "survival" level of the personal surplus (embodied in the de…nition of z F j ) below which even a fully altruistic agent is not willing to sacri…ce himself for the bene…t of his fellows. Notice that, were it not so, a low bene…t agent might deviate and declare high bene…t.
For j = 1, the agent's objective function is the sum of two components:
where
and
where d j t 2 ; d 1 1 ; j 6 = 1; is the the optimal report of a type t 2 individual who reported
in the …rst period, when the j-group principal plays his equilibrium strategy -that is,
The other symbols with an asterisk are similarly de…ned. Equation (11) de…nes the expected continuation payo¤ throughout period 2 and takes into account both the possibility of stabilization and the uncertainty on individual future evaluation of the public good.
Finally, we make the following additional assumptions:
This is an innocuous normalization.
Assumption a2 c < n 1
Only under a2 high type individuals might pro…t from reporting low type.
Assumption a3 a = 1; e = 0
To simplify, we consider only the case in which type-a agents assign the same weight to their own material bene…t and to their fellows', and type e agents are indi¤erent to the fate of their fellows. This allows us to label type-a agents altruists and type-e ones egoists.
Assumption a4
The parameters are such that in an isolated interaction ine¢ ciency obtains at equilibrium.
Asymmetric information is an interesting problem to study only if e¢ ciency cannot be obtained at equilibrium. Below ine¢ ciency is guaranteed at equilibrium by assumption a4 0 together with assumption a7 (see p. 10 and Appendix A).
As mentioned, we require ex-post budget balance.
This assumption puts a ceiling to the possibility of maneuvering payments for encouraging truth-telling.
Analysis
Let us simply state the problem. The principal of a j-group, j 6 = 1; solves the following program, assuming that truth-telling obtains in the …rst period.
Conditions (13)- (16) simply requires feasibility within our framework. Inequality (17) imposes individual rationality and inequality (18) requires that truth-telling is incentive compatible.
Consider now the principal's problem at j = 1 (in the following an asterisk denotes an object evaluated at the equilibrium values of program j).
The …rst-period principal solves the following program, assuming that the other …rst-period principals, if any, are playing the strategy (k) ; k = 0; :::; n:
Program 1 : max fr1(v 1 );g1(v 1 ;t 1 );8v 1 2V;8t 1 2T ; (k);k=0;:::;ng
kz 2 a; t 2 2 ; a; a; t 2 2 + (n k)z 2 ( e; t 2 2 ; e; e; t
Similar to program j de…nition, conditions (19)- (22) impose feasibility and inequality (23) is the intertemporal incentive compatibility constraint. Of course, at a symmetric Nash equilibrium it will be (k) = (k) ; k = 0; :::; n:
To simplify the analysis we make a further assumptions.
Assumption a7 Groups size is n = 2.
As a result, the number of possible type pro…les (states) is greatly reduced. We will comment on the generalization to the case of groups of any size in section 4.
When n = 2, assumption a4 simpli…es to:
Assumption a4' The probability p that an agent is of type h is such that p > 2 2c 2 c(1+ ) :
Now we have all the tools to develop our analysis. The …rst question we study is whether a …rst-period principal may …nd it pro…table to stabilize the group and communicate his information to the second-period principal. Preliminarily, let us state a simple fact.
Fact 1 In an isolated interaction, the group expected surplus is larger when the permanent type of each member is common knowledge than when it is private information.
Proof. See Appendix, part A.
It follows from Fact 1 that if eliciting information on permanent types were not costly, then group stabilization would certainly bene…t society, because in the second period common knowledge would induce higher surplus. However, notice that from a …rst-period principal's perspective, when a group is composed of two type-e agents group surplus would be larger when the group is dissolved and members go to fresh groups, but this would be detrimental for society.
Therefore the values of information for a group and for the whole society do not coincide.
Nevertheless, knowledge of group composition would be an asset that one would like to exploit, choosing whether stabilizing or dissolving the group. In a context of asymmetric information, extracting private information from the agents is costly. Does this cost exceed the bene…ts of common knowledge? We shall provide an answer in the next subsections.
Only one active group.
The analysis of the whole game is rather complex, so it is illuminating to study …rst the problem under the hypothesis that only one group exists.
We summarize our …ndings in the following.
Proposition 1 When only one group exists, the knowledge of group composition acquired through the …rst interaction cannot be exploited to increase per-period surplus with respect to the case of an isolated interaction. Formally, the …rst period principal never stabilizes the group, i.e.
(k) = 0; k = 0; ::; 2: Such result is due to the fact that when group stabilization is possible, the cost of inducing truthful reporting exceeds the e¢ ciency gain.
The same holds when many groups are supervised by a unique principal who aims at maximizing the surplus of the society.
Proof. The equilibrium allocations in stabilized groups coincide with those we characterized in proving Fact 1 under common knowledge of the individuals'permanent type (see Appendix A).
As fresh groups are concerned, the second-period principal computes the probability, ; that a member is of type-a by means of the Bayes'rule, under the assumption that at date 1 all agents reported their type truthfully; that is =
: Now, suppose (k) = 0; k = 0; ::; 2 at equilibrium. Then, it follows that = ; and hence the equilibrium allocation coincides with that we found in proving Fact 1 under asymmetric information.
In order to prove that at equilibrium it is really (k) = 0; k = 0; ::; 2; we show that the optimal strategies of the …rst-period principal belong to the subset of strategies such that no communication to the second-period principal will be undertaken.
The proof is not immediate. Indeed, the trick used in the proof of the ratchet e¤ect in Fudenberg and Tirole,1991, of constructing an equivalent static strategy through an appropriate averaging of the candidate optimal dynamic strategy, does not apply in our game. Precisely, no averaging can simultaneously conserve both the surplus of the group and that of each agent at their initial levels. So, we proceed in two steps. In the …rst step we consider a modi…ed mechanism in which the mentioned stratagem applies. In the second step we show that the optimal solution of the modi…ed mechanism also maximizes the original mechanism.
Step 1
Consider a new mechanism, which di¤ers from ours only in the timing of reporting: …rstly each agent con…dentially reports his permanent type to the principal, then each of them learns his bene…t from the public good and reports it without knowing the permanent type of his mates -except, of course, in stabilized groups in which no reporting of the permanent type is needed and members' permanent reported types are common knowledge.
egy in this modi…ed game , and let lotteries j (t
denote the surplus allocation for a j-group to an individual of type t i , i = 1; 2, who declares d j ;
when the reported state is b v j , j = 1; 2,s 0 ; s 1 ; s 2 :
The equilibrium surplus allocation in the whole game that a type-e individual expects before learning his private bene…t is Now let us consider the class of strategies for the …rst-period principal such that (k) = 0; k = 0; ::; 2: Observe that if a strategy in this class results to be optimal, also the second-period principal will be using it at equilibrium -we are assuming uniqueness for simplicity; of course, choosing a value for (k) 0 s is inessential in the second period. We name a strategy with (k) = 0; k = 0; ::; 2; a static strategy.
We will show that, whatever the equilibrium allocation set j ;we can always attain the principal's problem value by restricting attention to static strategies. This means that using information extracted in the …rst period is worthless. Next, consider an individual who is of type t in the …rst period and rewrite his surplus allocation for the whole game, let it be denoted by S (t 1 ; t 1 ; f g) ; when () and not j (); for all j, is adopted. Notice that the expected value of S (t 1 ; t 1 ; f g) (expectation is computed with respect to the probabilities of provision) equals E Notice that S (e; e; f g) can be obtained from S e; e; j by writing () instead of j in all states, and then simplifying.
It will be S (e; e; f g) = S e; e; j if the following set of elementary conditions on f g is satis…ed:
(eh; eh; eh: ) = 1 (eh; eh; eh:
Pr(k j e: ) (k) s k (eh; eh; eh: ) + (1 (k)) 2 (eh; eh; eh:
In the same way we get:
(ah; ah; 2ah) = 1 (ah; ah; 2ah) 
These conditions are such that the strategy that implements this f g is well de…ned: that is, both its r (v)'s and g(v; t)'s are de…ned in terms of all the equilibrium probabilities r j (v) and all the payments g j (v; t) in such a way that the allocation for a given type in a given state uses the same probabilities of providing the good as the other types' allocations in the same state.
Moreover each of these allocations is feasible, because it is a convex linear combination of feasible allocations contingent on the same state -so all constraints on payments and ex-post budget balance constraints are satis…ed. Now let us prove that the strategy that implements f g is incentive compatible. Unilateral deviations from truthful reporting to be considered are (indicating the true type on the left side and the false type on the right side): e ! a; a ! e; eh ! el; ah ! al:
Since by construction; each type's expected payo¤ from truthful reporting is the same under f g and j ; the strategy that implements f g is incentive compatible if the expected value of lottery S (t 1 ; d 1 ; f g) is lower than the expected value of lottery S t 1 ; d 1 ; j for each possible
Now, notice that the strategy that implements f g must induce an individual of type t 1 at date 1 to report t 1 . Instead the strategy that implements j ; j = 1; 2; s k; k = 0; 1; 2 must induce an individual that is of type t 1 at date 1 not only to report his true type in group 1 but also to report his true types in all the possible second period groups. Therefore the strategy which implements f g o¤ers less opportunities for lying that the strategy that implements j :
Thus we conclude that the expected value of lottery S (t 1 ; d 1 ; f g) is lower than the expected value of lottery S t 1 ; d 1 ; j .
Finally, noticing that the …rst-period principal gets the same group surplus as with j , we conclude that (f g ; f g) is not worse than j ; j = 1; :::; 2: Actually, the …rst-period principal's surplus coincides with the altruist expected payo¤ if at least one altruist belongs to the group and with twice the egoist expected payo¤ if only egoist agents compose the group. Given that our construction conserves total individual payo¤ for all types in any state, it also conserves …rst-period principal surplus 4 .
Step 2.
Let us come back to our original game, in which each agent learns and reports both dimensions of his type simultaneously. Note that the incentive constraints in the …rst-period mechanism are more restrictive than those considered in the modi…ed mechanism of step 1, since the deviations to be considered are eh ! al; eh ! el; eh ! ah; el ! al; ah ! eh; ah ! al; ah ! el; al ! el:
Notice that our assumption that material surplus must be nonnegative implies that no l type will ever report h type. 4 Recall that a high bene…t altruist's material surplus is one half of his surplus.
It follows that in the class of the strategies that use the information elicited in the …rst period no strategy can exist that does better than the best strategy in the modi…ed game above.
Let us consider the class of the strategies that do not use the information elicited in the …rst period. We will show that the system of incentive compatibility constraints in our game is equivalent to that in the modi…ed game. In what follows we directly replace in the ICs the optimal payments, which are described in Appendix A. Note that:
1) Incentive compatibility constraint IC(e; a) in the modi…ed game is equivalent to the two constraints IC(eh; al), IC(eh; ah) in the original game, since a low-type egoist does not have any incentive to lie. In fact in both games r( h; h) = 1; r( l; l) = 0 at equilibrium and hence
IC(e; a) is
pr(ah:al)) + (1 )pr(eh:al)g (32)
The preceding IC reads as follows. Take an egoist (addressed also as …rst player). The left-handside represents the payo¤ he obtains by truthfully reporting his permanent type. Suppose he is characterized by high bene…t (an event with probability p). He will obtain a positive surplus, the amount of which depends on the bi-dimensional type of his fellow. Conversely, an egoist with low bene…t (an event with probability 1 p) will obtain no surplus independently of his fellow's type. Let us discuss now how the positive expected surplus is formed. If the fellow has type (a; h); whose probability is p; the public good will be certainly provided. The egoist under scrutiny will get 1 at no cost. All the cost of provision is paid by his fellow. When the fellow has type (a; l) the good is provided with probability r(eh:al), but now the full cost is paid by the …rst player. Moreover, also the fellow can be of type-e. With probability p he will be of (e; h) type. In this case the good is certainly provided and the cost is equally shared. With probability 1 p the fellow is of (e; l) type: now the good is provided with probability r(eh:el) and all the cost is entirely born by the …rst player.
The right-hand-side represents agent's surplus when he lies on his permanent type. Once more he gets a positive surplus only when his own contingent type is h. Note that he has two possible lies: telling to be of (a; h) type or of (a; l) type. He will clearly opt for the one that secures more surplus to himself. Consider the possible cases. First, the egoist declares (a; h). When his fellow is of (a; h) type, the public good will be certainly provided and the cost is equally shared, because both individuals appear to have the same type. When the fellow is of (a; l) type the good is provided with probability r(ah:al) and all the cost is paid by the …rst player. Again, when the fellow is of (e; h) type the good is certainly provided and the cost is paid by the …rst player because he declared to be altruist. Finally, when the fellow is of (e; l) type, the good is provided with probability r(ah:el) and the cost is born by the …rst player. Suppose now the egoist declares to be of (a; l) type. If the fellow is of (a; h) type the good is provided with probability r(ah:al)
at the fellow's expenses. When the fellow is of (e; h) type the good is provided with probability r(eh:al) again at the fellow's expenses. Finally, note that when the fellow has contingent type l the good will be certainly not provided.
This incentive constraint is equivalent to the system of constraints IC(eh; al) and IC(eh; ah), that is
2) The system of incentive compatibility constraints IC(a; e) and IC(eh; el) in the modi…ed game is equivalent to the system of constraints IC(eh; el) and IC(ah; eh) in the original game. In fact since in both games r( h; h) = 1; r( l; l) = 0 at equilibrium, and a high altruist will certainly report h in both games, IC(a; e) is Therefore we have proved that the system of IC constraints in the modi…ed mechanism is equivalent to that of the original mechanism. This allows us to conclude that the class of the strategies for the modi…ed mechanism that do not use the information elicited in the …rst period is large enough to include the optimal strategy for our original game.
A careful examination of the proof above shows that dissolving the group is an equilibrium strategy no matter what the number of altruists and the number of existing groups are, provided that the equilibrium strategy used in fresh groups and in …rst-period groups is the same. It is immediately seen that the proof logic also applies to the case where one …rst-period principal supervises all …rst-period groups with the purpose of maximizing the overall surplus.
The result just obtained is due to a complex sort of ratchet e¤ect. In the standard framework, the ratchet e¤ect consists in the agent anticipating that in next rounds of interaction the principal will exploit the information elicited in the current round, so there is an incentive for the agent to lie on his type; restoring the incentive to telling the truth entails an additional cost to the principal that overcomes the bene…t of exploiting the information. In our framework the story is more complicated, since the expectation that the principal will intertemporally exploit information triggers three distinct perverse incentive e¤ects.
The …rst -that we call "plain ratchet e¤ect" -corresponds to the situation described above:
good-type agents are reluctant to declare truthfully their permanent type fearing that the principal will use it to their disadvantage in the current and in the following rounds. However setting a = 1 and e = 0 as we did for simplicity, causes this e¤ect to vanish; in fact, perfectly altruist agents do not care about possible reductions of their own surplus, as they look at the whole group surplus. This allows us to focus on the remaining two e¤ects, that are much less straightforward.
The second e¤ect -that we call "chain of lies e¤ect" consists in an agent misreporting his permanent type in the …rst period in order to get the chance of advantageously lying on his temporary type in the second period. This e¤ect only regards an egoist: he can falsely declare himself to be altruist in the …rst period to increase the probability of group stabilization; if the group is indeed stabilized, he will report low bene…t in case he discovers himself to be a high bene…t individual. Speci…cally, as a consequence of the …rst lie he will face an incentive constraint designed for an altruist, and therefore inappropriate for inducing an egoist to tell the truth. An obvious case in which this e¤ect does prevent the exploitation of the information elicited during the …rst period, arises when the principal sets (k) = 1; for all k -recall that Fact 1 ensures that in this case the group expected surplus in the second period is greater than in the case (k) = 0 for all k. For simplicity, let us consider the case of a single group. An altruist has no reason to lie: in fact, by telling the truth he can only end up in groups s 1 and s 2 and in both such groups e¢ ciency results; on the opposite, by lying he risks to be part of group s 0 where ine¢ ciency prevails. Instead, egoists …nd it pro…table to lie. This is an immediate implication of Proposition 1 -still, we o¤er an independent proof in the Appendix B. Crucially, note that it is the possibility of a second lie that makes the incentive constraint of egoists especially hard to satisfy. In fact, once the egoist has declared altruist, he pro…ts from declaring low even when he is high 5 , so the perspective of the second lie increases the attractiveness of the …rst 6 .
5 Once in a s 1 -group a false altruist who happens to be high obtains p by lying and 1 c by telling the truth. We know that p > 1 c, as this inequality is implied by the ine¢ ciency condition, that can be rewritten as p > (1 c)
. This inequality also follows from the ine¢ ciency condition, since 2 2c 2 (1+ )c > 2 2c 2 c : 6 For some triplets of parameters, absent the possibility of the second lie, the egoist would not …nd it advantageous to tell the …rst lie in front of the announcement 0 = 1 = 2 = 1: In fact the payo¤ of truthtelling is p
; while that of the single lie would
In fact, for p = 3=4; c = 3=4; = 3=4 the two expressions amount to 0:345 7 and 0:552 9, respectively.
The third e¤ect -probably the most surprising at …rst sight -concerns altruists: even a perfect altruist, who does aim at maximizing group surplus, may be tempted to declare to be an egoist to modify the probabilities of public good provision, in order to enforce what she myopically sees as an improvement in group welfare. We label this e¤ect "white lie e¤ect". The point is that the principal is assumed to have a commitment to implement -in a time consistent way -the strategy initially announced; agents, instead, are by de…nition followers, who maximize ex-post, taking the principal's announcement as given. So, in her reporting decision an agent whose objective function is perfectly aligned with the principal's, does not realize -qua agent -that the latter is subjecting himself to a costly constraint just for disciplining the egoists, and tries to improve upon the resulting outcome. The consequence is the opposite, since, in order to prevent such behavior, the principal is forced to subject himself to further constraints, and therefore to shift to a less preferred strategy.
Consider the following example, in which one principal controls all N …rst-period groups and N is in…nitely large -so the change in the expected composition of fresh groups due to an agent's deviation is negligible -and maximizes the overall surplus. Let c = p = = 3=4: When (k) = 0; for all k; e¢ ciency can never be obtained 7 . However, setting (0) = 0; (1) = 1; (2) = 0 would ensure full e¢ ciency in the second period. In fact, not surprisingly, e¢ ciency is warranted in group s 1 and, furthermore, thanks to the fact that the proposed selective group stabilization leads to a su¢ ciently greater than ; e¢ ciency would also obtain in a fresh group 8 . It can easily be shown that this move does not deteriorate the incentive for an egoist to declare truthfully her permanent type in the …rst period -indeed, an egoist who happens to be high and has declared her permanent type truthfully, in the second period obtains nearly the maximum conceivable surplus 9 . Instead, it is just the altruists who now have a clear incentive to lie: whoever an altruist's mate, group surplus is greater if the altruist declares egoist. To better see the point, let us consider the two possible cases. First case: the altruist has an altruist mate. The group will be stabilized thanks to the former altruist's lie, and thus he obtains the e¢ cient surplus. 7 The e¢ ciency condition p < is not satis…ed, as :75 > :727 27: 8 Since N is large, = 2 2 +(1 ) 2 = 0:9 and therefore the threshold for p would become p < 2 2c 2 c(1+ ) = 0:869 57, so the e¢ ciency condition would be satis…ed -recall that it is p = :75:
9 More precisely -remember that her payo¤ is only nonzero when she happens to be high -it can be shown that by lying she has only to lose. In fact, if her mate is an altruist, she would obtain the payo¤ of an egoist in the fresh group, rather that the payo¤ of an egoist in a s1 group, which is greater (there she is sure of being matched with an altruist); if instead her mate is an egoist, the group would be stabilised, so the best payo¤ she can get is by declaring low (again the chain of lies) and is equal to p (in fact by declaring high, as a supposed altruist, she would be asked to pay all the cost of the good, and thus obtain 1 c, which is less than p since the assumption p > 2 1 c 2 c implies p > 1 c) while by declaring truthfully, she would obtain the payo¤ of an egoist in the fresh mechanism, which in this case is greater (indeed for p = c = 3=4 and = 9=10 it can easily be checked that it is p + (1 )
Instead, by telling the truth, both fellows would be reallocated to fresh groups, where they would get each less than half of the e¢ cient pie. Second case: the altruist has an egoist mate. The lie will cause reallocation to fresh groups, which is preferable to stabilization (stabilization would only ensure the e¢ cient group surplus, while reallocation in fresh groups allows one altruist and one egoist to obtain more because e¢ ciency is also secured and the ratio of altruists to egoists exceeds 1:1).
In…nitely many active groups.
We now turn to the case in which N groups exist and, according to the initial description of the game, each …rst-period principal aims at maximizing the surplus of the group he supervises. Since his …rst-period choices concur in determining the composition of second-period fresh groups, a strategic interaction between …rst-period principals arises. In this context Proposition 1 cannot be assumed to hold, since no game among …rst-period principals is considered there. So, group stabilization cannot be excluded. Of course, Proposition 1 implies that stabilization can only deteriorate social surplus.
In the following, the number of groups is so large that each …rst-period principal can neglect the impact of his own stabilization decisions on the composition of fresh groups.
Before presenting our results, let us explain, on intuitive grounds, why the strategy of never stabilizing groups may not be Nash. If all the other …rst-period principals dissolved their groups, one principal might …nd it advantageous to selectively stabilize his group: in particular, when both members are of type-e; letting them go is attractive, since they will gain surplus in fresh groups at the expense of type-a agents coming from other groups; conversely, stabilizing the group when this is composed of two type-a individuals ensures more surplus than reallocation into fresh groups. So, a free riding problem characterizes the interaction between …rst-period principals. Nevertheless, group stabilization does not necessarily occur in equilibrium, since eliciting and exploiting private information on members'permanent type is still made costly by the ratchet e¤ect.
As regards the computation of Nash equilibria, thanks to N being in…nitely large we can easily verify whether a given strategy for …rst-period principals is Nash by solving a simple linear programming problem -as we saw, a …rst period principal knows that the composition of fresh groups is independent of his own decision. Below we present an example in which group stabilization obtains at equilibrium, and an example in which stabilization does not obtain.
Let be = 1=2; c = 3=4; p = 3=4; n = 2; N in…nitely large. The strategy of always dissolving the group is not Nash since the best reply of a …rst-period principal to such a strategy is (0) = 0; (1) = 1; (2) = 11 15 ; which would get him an expected surplus of 1:610 -notice that he will set r 1 (eh:al) = :7416; r 1 (ah:al) = :9841; r 1 (eh:el) = :4674; r 1 (ah:el) = 1; r 1 ( h: h) = 1; r 1 ( l: l) = 0; instead the strategy of always dissolving the group brings him 2 (786222) = 1:572 only. Therefore unilateral deviation is pro…table.
Then, consider stabilizing the group with probability (0) = 0; (1) = 1; (2) = :4720: A …rst-period principal knows that, independently of his move, the probability that a member of a fresh group is of type a is = 2 (1 (2))+2 (1 )(1=2)(1 (1)) 2 (1 (2))+(1 (1))2 (1 )+(1 (0))(1 ) 2 ; that is = :34627. If we compute a …rst-period principal's optimal reply we …nd (0) = 0; (1) = 1; (2) = :4720;
and so a Nash equilibrium occurs -he will set r 1 (ah:al) = 1; r 1 (eh:el) = :1386; r 1 (eh:al) = :6944; r 1 (ah:el) = 1. Group expected surplus at equilibrium is 0:7799 + :7803 = 1: 5602: Notice that, as we expected, group expected surplus at equilibrium is less than it would be if always dissolving the group could be an equilibrium strategy.
Instead consider the parameter constellation = Indeed a …rst-period principal's optimal reply is (2) = 0; (1) = 0; (0) = 0 10 .
We summarize our results in the following:
Proposition 2 When a very large number of groups exist, group stabilization can be obtained in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore the knowledge of group composition acquired in the …rst interaction has a positive economic value for the group.
However, per period expected group surplus cannot be greater than in a single isolated interaction.
Discussion and extensions
First of all, notice that removing the assumption that the levels of bene…t, which type-h and typel players derive from the public good, are the same across periods, does not invalidate Proposition 1. Moreover Proposition 1 still holds if a discount factor di¤erent from 1 is introduced, and also if a greater (eventually in…nite) number of periods is considered. Notice, in this regards, that no stable groups can dissolve after the second interaction since the share of altruists in fresh groups may only decreases over time. Also the assumption that group size is n = 2 can be easily generalized. We conjecture that at Nash equilibrium only groups in which the share of altruists 1 0 The probability that a member is of type a in a fresh group is = is between a lower and an upper bound might be stabilized.
More interesting is to reconsider the assumptions concerning: a) the principal's powers; b) the de…nition of altruism 4.1 Principal' s powers.
In principle, we may imagine several ways to modify principal's powers. Below, we content ourselves to examine one situation in which the principal has more powers and one in which he has less powers than we have assumed until now.
First: more powers. Recall the assumption that …rst-period principals do not set the secondperiod groups allocations. Furthermore second-period principals are assumed to hold no more information about permanent types than group members.
The …rst assumption is made only for simplicity and is not essential for the results above. In fact, assuming mechanism coordination across periods can improve the value of the best dynamic strategy, but Proposition 1 continues to apply (the proof above holds whatever the candidate optimum strategy). On the other hand, when …rst period principals play Nash, giving them greater powers in case of group stabilization could only enlarge the set of parameter triplets for which in the symmetric equilibrium group stabilization obtains.
The second assumption rules out the possibility of an informed second-period principal who might prefer not to reveal information to agents. Further research is needed to analyze this possibility.
Second: less powers. The principal might not be endowed with the power of stabilizing groups, since this decision might be thought to be in the hands of group members. Of course, this requires that group composition is common knowledge after the …rst period. The e¤ects of this alternative power distribution are easily understood in our framework. After the …rst round agents will unanimously choose to terminate their relationship when no altruist is present, and to continue it when there are either one or two altruists 11 . So -irrespectively of whether one principal controls symmetrically all groups, or instead N principals play Nash -in equilibrium no altruist will be present in fresh groups.
1 1 It is immediate to intuit why two altruists prefer to stay together (so they split the e¢ cient surplus, instead of receiving each less than half of it in fresh groups) and two egoists have nothing to gain from staying together (that is the worst group composition from their point of view). When only one of them is an altruist, the egoist prefers continuation, since it ensures him the best possible payo¤. As to the altruist, he must compare the e¢ cient group surplus secured by the s 1 -group with the sum of the expected material payo¤ of one altruist and one egoist in a fresh group. It is clear that this sum is less than the e¢ cient group surplus as soon as < 1=2 (in that case one altruist and one egoist together receive less than expected group surplus, which is at most the e¢ cient surplus). The last step is to observe that when (2) = 1 and (0) = 0 it is: =
(1 )(1 1 ) 2 (1 )(1 1 )+(1 ) 2 , which is certainly less than 1=2 irrespectively of the value of 1 . Therefore, we are de facto in the situation in which (k) = 1; for all k: In this case, as we proved when illustrating the chain of lies e¤ect, egoists cannot be prevented from lying in the …rst period. Notice that the …rst-period principal has no instruments at his disposal for countering the incentive of a low bene…t egoist to declare altruist, since, whatever the …rst period allocation, he is indi¤erent as to reporting his permanent type. So separation of altruists from egoists becomes impossible. This means that altruism is completely ine¤ective in the …rst period -or, more generally, in all periods except the last.
Altruism.
The de…nition of altruism we have adopted above in intertemporal decisions with mobility is such that in the …rst period altruists are concerned with the future fate of their …rst-period mates.
Indeed, a di¤erent variety of altruism is conceivable: as far as future periods are concerned, in today's decisions an altruist cares about the future surplus not of today's but of tomorrow's fellows. This slight change has signi…cant e¤ects. Going back to the example presented above for describing the white lie e¤ect, it is straightforward to check that the strategy we have examined in that context would become feasible. In fact, now for an altruist the shift from (1) = 0 to (1) = 1 generates no incentive to declare egoist: indeed his objective function is satis…ed exactly at the same level irrespective of whether the group is stabilized or not, since in both cases group surplus takes on the e¢ ciency level. Observe that in this example selective group stabilization is socially bene…cial. On commenting this result one could notice that the initial de…nition of altruism is more "particularistic"in nature, so it is not surprising if under that initial de…nition altruists exert greater resistance to the principal's attempts at maximizing social surplus. Still, the "particularistic" de…nition seems to us more realistic as a description of concern for group welfare.
Conclusions
The model we presented helps clarify that, in hidden information contexts, the value of repeated interactions is not necessarily embodied in long-lasting fruitful relationships themselves but rather in the possibility of eliciting information about group composition in the …rst stage of interaction and using it for selectively stabilizing or terminating relationships. Suppose for instance that all the principals but one adopt the strategy of never stabilizing groups. Then the remaining principal may …nd it advantageous to stabilize groups with a relatively high share of altruists, and discontinue the others. This possibility is limited, but not necessarily excluded, by the agent's reluctance to reveal their degree of cooperativeness. In fact we …nd Nash equilibria with stabilization. The di¤erence between the two statements above is not apparent in Ghosh and Ray's model, since their bad agents (i.e. the impatient) have "non cooperation" as the dominant strategy, so they self-select themselves away from good agents -who, on their turn, have nothing to gain from being considered bad. So all productive relationships (those with 2 patients players in their setting) persist in equilibrium. Instead, in our model, given that both types have good reasons for cheating, exploiting information requires that certain fruitful relationships be discontinued (in particular those with two altruists). Furthermore, the decision of one principal on group termination exerts externalities on the other principals, via the expected composition of fresh groups. Thus, whilst social surplus and group surplus coincide in Ghosh and Ray's model, in our model maximization of group surplus may entail the stabilization of some groups, despite social surplus is certainly less with stabilization than in the case of non repeated interactions.
Our model also sheds some light on the e¤ects of altruism in social relationships. On the one hand, due to adverse intertemporal incentives connected with private information, the presence of even perfect altruists can be ine¤ective at improving social surplus when mobility decisions are left to individual discretion. On the other hand, the notion of altruism, that appears natural in the context of a single group, appears particularistic when it is applied to an intertemporal context with mobility, so altruism may results less bene…cial to society than it is in a sequence of non repeated interactions. written as an equality.
What remains to prove is our hypothesis that constraints (41)-(43) are binding. Let us add three slack variables u 1 , u 2 , and u 3 ; required to obtain equality. Then, compute again the system solutions which are now expressed as (cumbersome) functions of r(eh:el) and of all the slacks. Finally, substitute them into the principal objective function and take …rst derivatives with respect to u 1 , u 2 , u 3 . It results:
@S @u 2 = 2p (1 p) (1 c) (1 c) (1 p) 1 + pc c 2p < 0 (50)
-recall that 1 + pc c 2p is negative by assumption a4'.
This proves that our hypothesis is true: at equilibrium IC(eh; el), IC(eh; al), IC(ah; eh) are binding.
When the probabilities take the values de…ned in (44) and (45), it is dS dr(eh:el) = 0, thus r(eh:el) can really be set at discretion.
So let us set it to its equilibrium value in a group where it is common knowledge that there are no altruists, that is r(eh:el) = p 1 c=2 p (1 p)(1 c) : Then it is immediately veri…ed that r(eh:al) = r(ah:el) = p 2p 1+c pc < 1 for p < 1, r(ah:al) = 1 2 c+c +2 r(ah:el) < 1 since it is both r(ah:el) < 1 and c+c +2 = (2 + c) c= < 2:
Therefore, we conclude that expected group surplus is lower when individual permanent types are private information than when they are common knowledge.
Appendix B.
This appendix proves that when N = 1, (0) = (1) = (2) = 1 cannot occur at equilibrium.
When (0) = (1) = (2) = 1 the second-period expected surplus of an egoist if he reports a (and then he optimally declares l) is p 2 , while if he truthfully reports e it is:
where = r(eh:el) is the probability of providing the good when there are two egoists with opposite evaluations in the s 0 -mechanism. Let denote the highest value of such that lying is preferable for an egoist, so solves p (p + (1 p)(1 c)) + p (1 ) [p (1 c=2) + (1 p)(1 c) ]
